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Invited Debate: Response
Not All Effects Are Created Equal: A Rejoinder To Sawilowsky
J. Kyle Roberts

Robin K. Henson

University of North Texas

University of North Texas

In the continuing debate over the use and utility of effect sizes, more discussion often helps to both clarify and
syncretize methodological views. Here, further defense is given of Roberts & Henson (2002) in terms of
measuring bias in Cohen’s d, and a rejoinder to Sawilowsky (2003) is presented.
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Introduction

For all practical purposes, our answer to
this question was NO. As we stated in our article,
“the amount of bias in d remained small under
most conditions of consideration . . . [and the]
incredibly small amount of difference between the
population d and the average sample d leads us to
believe that d is in fact not biased in terms of
practical differences” (p. 247, 251).
Second, we examined Thompson’s (2002)
proposed correction of d for accuracy and to see
whether or not the correction was even necessary.
In response to this proposed correction, we state,
“although this correction of d seems to make sense
theoretically, it overcorrects for the actual amount
of bias” (p. 251).
As we begin our reply, we would like to
note that NOWHERE in the rebuttal does
Sawilwosky (2003) refute either of these findings.
Instead, the arguments fall into two categories:
minor criticisms that are mostly methodological,
and one major criticism that has to do with the
publishing of reported effect sizes. Once again, it
bears mentioning that none of these criticisms,
once having addressed and clarified the
methodological issues, directly calls into suspect
the findings of Roberts and Henson (2002).

Under a spirit of collegiality and zeal to further the
field of research, dialogues like this play an
important role in discussing areas where
researchers both agree and disagree. Through
open-ended dialogue, it is hoped that readers will
continue to see the benefit in debate about
important topics.
In this brief rejoinder to Sawilowsky
(2003), we will provide discussion to the nine
minor criticisms and one major criticism point by
point. Although the first portion of his paper is
lengthy, it does not bear comment on because it
was expertly written and we do not disagree with
any of the substance laid therein.
As we respond to each of the criticisms,
however, we feel it important to note two things.
First, the point of our paper was to show whether
or not Cohen’s d contains any amount of bias and
is therefore in need of a correction to account for
this bias.
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Dr. Henson is an Assistant Professor of educational
research. His areas of research include applied
statistics, measurement, reliability generalization,
and self-efficacy theory. Correspondence can be
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Responses to Minor Criticisms
Criticism 1: Effect sizes help evaluate
Although we agree with Sawilowsky’s
statement that effect sizes do not evaluate the
effect of a difference or relationship, we want to
note that we pointed out in our paper that the
purpose of the effect size is to “help evaluate the
magnitude of a difference” (emphasis ours, p.
241); for judgments are of course made by people.
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As Sawilowsky (2003) quoted this very statement,
we do not see any point of disagreement here.
Criticism 2: S-PLUS Random Number Generator
As Sawilowsky makes a good point about
resetting the random number seed, it should be
pointed out that this seed was reset for both
populations so that they weren’t identical.
Concerning the random number generator (RNG)
in S-PLUS, however, we feel that the critic isms
are unwarranted. The DIEHARD tests for
randomness were designed to work on RNGs that
assume 32 random bits. The RNG for S-PLUS is
31 bit. As a result it should be assumed that the
RNG will fail some of the tests that are 32 bit
based. If there is a need for a 32 bit RNG, then SPLUS users can install a patch that will paste
together 16 bits from each of two consecutive
numbers and then the S-PLUS RNG will pass all
of the DIEHARD tests. Also, the bug which
Sawilowsky speaks of only applies to the ChiSquare distribution function when X is large (e.g.,
10^13). (Our thanks to Tim Hesterberg from
Insightful Corporation for his guidance concerning
the RNG).
Criticism 3: Typo!!
The entry of .0611 for the maximum r 2
when d = .00 and n1 =n2 =10 in Table 2 should read
.611.
Criticism 4: Negative values for d
Although Sawilowsky (2003) disagrees,
there are instances when a minimum d is actually
less than zero. Consider the directional hypothesis
t-test where we are comparing the effects of a diet
pill on 100 people. We randomly assign people to
one of two groups; experimental and control. The
point of the study is to show the effect of the diet
pill on the experimental group. Let’s suppose that
when we compare the mean weights of the people
at the beginning of the study and note that both
group means are 200, and then again at the end of
the study and note

X exp = 225

and the

X control = 200 . If we were to consider that the σ =
35, then we could compute the d for this study as:

d=

200 − 225
= −0.714 .
35

(1)

Consider that it would be incorrect to interpret the
absolute value of this formula (Cohen, 1988,
formula 2.2.2) because we are witnessing an actual
negative effect of the diet pill (e.g., people who
took the diet pill actually gained weight). If we
were to follow the logic of Sawilowsky, we would
either interpret this as a positive effect or simply
assume the effect is zero. In this case, interpreting
a negative effect is important. It means that the
diet pill worked worse than if we had done nothing
at all! Sawilowsky also mistakenly states that the
minimum effect (or d) should be defined as zero
when in fact this is not true (c.f., Cohen, 1988,
formula 2.2.1, p. 20).
As this formula applies to our study, we
explicitly stated in our manuscript (p. 247) that the
design of the study was to test this specific effect
with a directional hypothesis where the expected
effect was that the experimental group would have
a larger mean in the population than did the
control group (except for the case where d = .00).
Criticism 5: Repetitions
Although Sawilowsky and Yoon (2001)
used 10,000 replication, we felt that 5,000 was
plenty to obtain generalizability. This was not a
limitation due to using a macro in S-PLUS as SPLUS is a programming language and changing
the number of replications is as simple as typing a
new number into the script file. However, since
Sawilowsky posited this as a criticism of the
study, we re-ran all analysis with 10,000
replications and noticed that even under extreme
condit ions, estimates typically did not differ until
the 1000th decimal place!
Criticism 6: Sampling without replacement
We feel that we may have been
misleading with our statement, “5,000 pairs of
sample data were randomly drawn without
replacement at the specified sample sizes”
(Roberts & Henson, 2002, p. 246). What would
have been better stated is that we sampled without
replacement within each given replication. After
people were drawn from the population for the
replication, they were then re-inserted into the
population at the completion of that replication.
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We chose this method because it seemed
counterintuitive to allow for the inclusion of the
same person twice within each study (although the
probability for being chosen twice is less than 1%
for n = 100). We should have been clearer in
pointing out that we sampled with replacement
across the replications, just not inside each
replication.
Criticism 7: Redundancy is reinforcement!!
Although Sawilowsky points out that there
was no need for 2/3 of our study since there was
no change in the standardized values, we felt it
important to further reinforce the point that the
spread of the data make simply a marginal
difference in effecting the bias (or lack thereof) in
both d and r2. We would argue that if the results
really were redundant then we would see exactly
the same values in each of the tables, which we in
fact did not. Therefore the inclusion of all three
tables serves to reinforce the point that under
multiple conditions, d shows practically no bias.
Criticism 8: Results that shouldn’t be published?
This criticism probably should have been
labeled under the “major criticisms” because it
states “there is little justification for publishing
Monte Carlo work when results can be computed
easily and directly.” As per our manuscript, we
would again point out that the purpose of it was
two-fold: to see if d contained bias and to see if
Thompson’s (2002) correction formula should be
applied. If nothing else than to show that
Thompson’s formula “overcorrects for the actual
amount of bias” (Roberts & Henson, 2002, p.
251), then the manuscript has merit. Furthermore
our study shows that even though the correction
cited by Sawilowsky may apply to meta-analysis,
it seems of little concern to attempt to correct d in
directional hypothesis settings.
Criticism 9: Compelling reasons to report effect
sizes
We might restate that it was not the
purpose of our study to present a “compelling
reason to report effect sizes when the null
hypothesis remains tenable.” Our purpose was to
investigate the bias in d. However, having said that
we would like to add that in any given study, we
may obtain a result in which the null hypothesis is
tenable, but that doesn’t mean that the effect is not
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real! We will deal more thoroughly with this in
the next section.
Response to Major Criticism
Is the Effect Trivial or Not?
Sawilowsky (2003) suggests that he and
Yoon (2001) never “argued that small effects can
in some cases be due solely to sampling error” as
we summized (Roberts & Henson, 2002, p. 245).
Nevertheless, in their paper Sawilowsky and Yoon
(2001) noted that reporting their simulated average
Cohen’s d effect of .17 would be “misleading
because these effect sizes are specious” (p. 2). In
their conclusion, the authors claimed: “It was
shown that effect sizes should not be reported or
interpreted in the absence of statistical
significance” (Sawilowsky & Yoon, 2001, p. 4).
(It should be noted as well that only the
Sawilowsky & Yoon [2001] paper was referenced
in our original article. Sawilowsky and Yoon’s
2002 article resulting from this paper was not in
print during our manuscript development, and
therefore was not considered in our article.)
If Sawilowsky is not arguing that these
effect sizes could be solely due to sampling error,
then why not report and interpret them? Indeed,
the average d of .17 was presented as a case when
a non-zero effect was obtained from purely
random numbers. Surely the logic of this
conclusion suggests that small effects can be
obtained even when the null hypothesis remains
tenable under a statistical significance test. If the
significance test is to be trusted over the small
effect size, then from whence must the researcher
conclude the effect originated? Under this logic,
the effect must have been a function of sampling
error.
Confused vs Informed Methodology and
Readership
Sawilowsky (2003) proceeds in his major
criticism by presenting two literatures of effect
sizes (A and B). He supposes that after reading
one of these literatures, a reader may be
“thoroughly confused on the effectiveness of the
intervention” (p. 223) because of the presence of
non-statistically significant results mixed with
other, presumably, statistically significant results.
We agree that interpretation of such a literature
may present certain challenges. Nevertheless, we
would be hopeful that a more informed use of
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statistics would be the solution to this difficulty
rather than avoidance of potential confusion by
replacing it with another source of misleading
information.
(As a caveat, we would also be hopeful
that even a modestly informed consumer of
research would be able to determine the expected
directionality of an effect, and whether the
experimental group is expected to outperform or
underperform the control on relevant outcomes.
This assumes, perhaps, at least a modestly
effective job at communication from the authors.)
It is at this point that we fundamentally
disagree with Sawilowsky (2003). It is perhaps
very appealing to some to employ statistical
significance as a gatekeeper for reporting and
interpreting meaningful outcomes. As we cited
previously, Robinson and Levin (1997) and Levin
and Robinson (2000) propose a reasoned argument
for just such a two-stage process, where a finding
must be deemed statistically significant before
evaluation of the effect size is permitted. Of
course, this would work only to the extent that the
gatekeeper is effective in performing its duties.
This process also will only work when (a)
the readership of the article understands fully the
factors impacting statistical significance tests and
the elements of power that underlie them and (b)
the author understands and communicates these
issues directly. Unfortunately, empirical studies
have demonstrated that there are a great number of
misconceptions about statistical significance
testing (cf., Nelson, Rosenthal, Rosnow, 1986;
Oakes, 1986; Rosenthal & Gaito, 1963; M.
Zuckerman, Hodgins, A. Zuckerman, &
Rosenthal, 1993), and so neither of these outcomes
is likely on a widespread basis. Is this the
method’s fault or our own? We would suggest, of
course, primarily the latter. Unfortunately,
statistical significance testing has come to be
treated among many researchers as a truly
dichotomous outcome that relates directly to result
importance. This interpretation is a result of many
factors, none of which make the misinterpretation
any more correct. As Sawilowsky (2003) correctly
indicated, the context of the study is critical when
interpreting both statistical significance and effect
size outcomes.
It is of course very true that a small effect
size may be due to sampling error. It is also just as
true that the same small effect size may be a real

effect in spite of it not being statistically
significant due to a lack of power. The arguments
presented by Sawilowsky (2003) simply do not
discount the possibility (and yes, historical truth)
that some very real effects may exist but be at risk
of not being discovered due to a lack of statistical
significance. Meta-analytically speaking, however,
when these small but non-statistically significant
effects are examined across studies, a more
meaningful outcome may be discovered. While it
is very easy for methodologists to say that these
studies should have had more power, it is much
more difficult to attain sufficient power for every
study in all applied situations. Should we pay
more attention to power? Yes, of course. Should
we also recognize that some small effects may
indeed be reasonable outcomes not due entirely to
sampling error? Absolutely!
A better approach to this issue, in our
view, would not just result in discussion of
whether statistical significance should be the
gatekeeper, or even whether small effects should
necessarily be reported and/or interpreted, but
rather how methodologists and applied researchers
can seek a more informed understanding and use
of both of these statistics for what they are.
Conclusion
Effect sizes are not final determinants regarding
whether a result is meaningful any more than
statistical significance tests are, and if we interpret
effect sizes with the same rigidity that we have
historically interpreted statistical significance
testing, we are guilty of committing the same error
yet again. Instead, researchers ought to view their
studies in context with prior literature, make
comparisons between their outcomes and those
from prior studies, attend to power issues, and
interpret the findings to the readership for what
they are.
Is a small yet non-statistically significant
effect important? Maybe, maybe not. We certainly
would not know for sure without replication and
some form of meta-analysis. We certainly could
not do either of these, at least in a world where
Type II error exists as much as its Type I
counterpart, unless these same small effects were
reported.
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